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by a few months, since the series begin in that
year and an earlier turn cannot be ruled out for
certain. For comparison with peaks and troughs
in general business activity, the chart shades
periods of business contraction.4 Cyclical move-
ments in the rates that do not correspond to
reference cycles, and reference phases skipped by
the rates, are noted on the chart. Many such
discrepancies occurred, but on the whole all the
rates usually conform well to business activity,
as has long been recognized. Many of the dis-
crepancies pertain to the 1930—49 period. Finan-
cial disorders produced extra cycles in rates in
the early 1930's; then, with depressed business
activity and rapid growth in the money stock
during the second half of the 1930's, interest rates
declined steeply and did not respond in the
usual way to the business cycle.During and
after World War II the Federal Reserve pegged
U.S. bond and bill yields, indirectly affecting all
interestrates, which explains skipped cycles
during the 1940's. Aside from these episodes, the
only other discrepancy from 1919 to 1961 was
the 1924—26 reference expansion skipped by most
bond yields reflecting prolonged declines from
the high levels attained in 1920. Between 1878
and 1913 there were few discrepancies. Begin-
ning the analysis with 1878 avoids atypical
behavior in the 1870's, when most series had
extra cycles during the 1873—79 business depres-
sion; in that respect the period resembles the
1930's.
Since 1953 the rates covered by Chart 1 have
conformed to every reference phase, which some
commentators take as indication of a fundamen-
tal chaffge in the money market.Important
changes have occurred, to be sure, but the con-
formity does not appear exceptional. Call money
and commercial paper rates had nearly perfect
conformity to the ten reference cycles from 1885
to 1919. The chief discrepancies are associated
with special disturbances in the money market.
After all, price and output series, most of which
conform closely to general business activity, also
undergo unusual movements when subject to
special developments such as strikes and wartime
controls. Yet there is a clear difference: Interest
For the dates see Geoffrey H. Moore (ed.), Business
Cycle Indicaters-,Princeton University Press for National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1961,1,670.The latest
reference trough is February 1961.
rates appear to reflect special influences more
often than price and output series do, and each
time for a longer period. The highly volatile
behavior of financial markets is well known and
needs no documentation here.
For present purposes it appears more fruitful
to confine the analysis to the typical behavior
of interest rates. Most of the analysis therefore
excludes the 1930's and 1940's, World War I,
and the post-Civil War period to 1878.That
leaves the period since 1953 to compare with the
1920's, and these two decades to compare with
the four and a half decades between 1878 and
1914.
Chart 2 shows the cyclical behavior of interest
rates on a reference cycle basis.The patterns
suggest two tendencies to be examined in detail:
a shift toward earlier turning points in relation
to reference turns and a greater amplitude of
fluctuation in the 1950's than earlier. Timing is
discussed in Section A and amplitude in Section B
of Part II.
II Changes in Cyclical Behavior
A Timing
The generally lagged timing of interest rates
at reference turns, evident in Chart 1, is summa-
rized by Table 1, which gives the median lag of
each rate in selected periods. The table covers
the 1920's and 1950's (excluding World War I
and the period from 1930 to the post-World
War II unpegging of long-term rates in 1951),
and the period 1879 to 1913 divided at 1900.
(The main reason for dividing at 1900 is that
two long-term rates are first covered just before
that year.) Extra turns in the rates not match-
ing reference cycles are ignored. Also, reference
turns which a series skips are excluded. A com-
parison of median lags for rates that cover a dif-
ferent number or set of turns can be misleading.
The medians appear satisfactory, however, for
bringing out the changes in timing of each rate
over time.
The length of the average lag of long rates has
clearly declined at peaks and troughs.Some
decline occurred between each period, and by
the 1950's the lag had disappeared and in many
series gave way to short leads. For short rates
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TABLE 1. —MEDIANLEAD (—)ORLAG (+) OF INTEREST RATES AT REFERENCE CYCLE TURNS,
SELECTED PERIODS (months)
Troughs • Peaks
Six: Four: Four: Three: Six: Four: Four: Three: .




















Treasury bills — — +1"> —2 — — —2 —1
Acceptances — 0")+4 +2 +1
Bank loans . — — +3 +4" +3 +5
Federal Reserve discount • — — +12 +5"' — — +10 +3
Bond yields
U.S. — — +4" 0 — — +5"' —1
Corporate Aaa --- — +5"'+1 — — +1"' —1
Corporate Baa — — +3°+2" — — +5"' +2
Corporate and municipal — +13 +4"'+1 — +9 +4" —1
Municipal — +5 +3" 0 — +8 +7" —1
Railroad +14 +7°+1") — +8(t)+11"+4"
New England municipal +20 +5 — — +10 +8 — —
SOURCE: Appendix Table A.
Note:Numbers in parentheses give the number of reference turin missed or not covered by the series in the period. Calculation of the median some.
times given ntmberu with the fraction 34, such as slag of 234 or 334 months; the 34'n have been dropped in the table.
in the 1920's than before World War I, but no
definite Change thereafter, and at troughs appar-
ently no change over all. The lag in timing of
long behind short rates, apparent before World
War I, has narrowed consistently over the years,
so that by the 1950's it was no longer evident.
Timing among the series shows the active
open-market rates generally turning first and
the rates of thin or negotiated markets turning
last.One indication of this patternisthat
Treasury bills and U.S. bonds usually have the
earliest turns, and bank loans and low-grade
corporate bonds the latest.The policy-deter-
mined Federal Reserve discount rate also turns
late. The call-money rate used t.o be consistent
with this sequence by generally turning ahead
of commercial paper rates, but it became a lag-
gard after World War II.These differences in
timing are all well known and, given certain
institutional developments, they are to be ex-
pected, except perhaps for the discount rate,
which could in theory lead all the other rates
under certain policies but in fact lagged under
the policies pursued.
The varied timing of the short rates points up
the difficulty of comparing their behavior before
and after World War I. The two short rates for
the pre-1914 period differ in function from those
available for the later period, and in addition
have changed in character over the years.Call
money rates are undoubtedly not the sensitive
indicator of money market conditions today that
they once were.There is some question also
about comparing commercial-paper rates today
with earlier times.5 A comparison of short rates
before and after World War I by means of these
data, therefore, may be misleading.For the
moment let us disregard this difficulty and sum-
marize the behavior of the open-market short
rates (that is, excluding bank loan and discount
rates).If we suppress deviant behavior by tak-
ing the median lag of rates at each turn, Table 2
gives an arithmetic average of these medians for
the earlier and later period, excluding the 1930's
and 1940's. The lag of short rates at peaks de-
clined significantly, but at troughs it increased
(though not significantly).The latter increase
appears exceptional, and if we exclude the 1921
depression, from which short rates recovered
unusually late, the average lag at troughs for
the later period drops to 2.1 months. That figure
suggests, more plausibly, that the lag diminished
slightly from the earlier period. The table also
gives averages for all of the long rates. Their lag
declined significantly at both peaks and troughs.
The large ranges of error for troughs in the
right-hand column of Table 2 reflect large varia-
tionsintiming betweendifferentreference
See Selden, Trends and Cycles in the Commercial Paper
Market.BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES. 7
TABLE 2 —ARITHMETICAVERAGE OF MEDIAN LAGS IN
SHORT AND LONG RATES AT SELECTED REFERENCE

























Souace: Appendix Table A.
Note: Parentheses contain range of error at .05 level of significance based
on the Idistribution,which assumes the normal distribution ot leads and lags
about reference peaks and troughs. Coverage: Turns covered are the same
as in Table 1 except for inclusion here of 1931 peak, and exclusion of one
trough and nne peak for bond yields from the beginning at the earlier period
(for 1879 and 1882). The excluded turns had very lung lags which would
make the medians for the earlier period even larger than they are.Rates
covered ore the same as Table I except for exclusion here of bank loan and
discount rates and of railroad bond yields after World War I.Exact coverage
is indicated in Table A.
troughs, but not exceptional variability between
the rates at each turn.Turning points in the
rates actually cluster relatively closer to each
other at troughs than at peaks, as demonstrated
by a measure of clustering in Table 3.The
TABLE 3. —DEGREEOF CLUSTERING OF CYCLICAL TURNS
IN SHORT AND LONG RATES, AS INDICATED BY VARIA-
TION IN LAGS AT SELECTED REFERENCE PEAXS AND
TROUGHS
F Ratios (and levels at significance):
Vatiation Between Reference Cycle Turns
as Multiple of Variation Around Each Turn
1879—1913 1919—65
Short rates
Troughs 4.6(.025) 10.7 (.005)
Peaks 0.27 (.05) 3.8 (.005)
Bond yields .
Troughs 9.4(.005) 4.0.0 (005)'
Peaks 4.9(.005) 7.0 (.005)
Note: Coverage is same as Table 2 except for inclusion here of bank loan
rate. Method of computation: If L., is the lag (in months) of ith interest rate
at reference turn 1,theF ratio is
T TI




where Li is the average lag of all rates at turn Land I is average lag of all ratm
at all turns.
measure compares as a ratio the variation in the
average lag of the rates among reference turns
with the variation in lags among the rates. The
ratio is significantly greater than unity in seven
of .the eight comparisons, indicating substantial
clustering. In all cases turns in the rates cluster
together more at troughs than at peaks and more
in the later than in the earlier period. The two
ratios for short rates in the later period would
probably be even larger if we excluded the insen-
sitive bank loan rate, not represented in the
earlier period.
The one ratio less than unity (absence of
clustering) among the eight comparisons —for
short rates at peaks in the earlier period —indi-
cates that turning points in call-money and com-
mercial-paper rates then conformed less closely
to each other than to reference turns. The call
money market was highly sensitive to business
conditions before the 1930's, producing close
conformity of the rate to general business activ-
ity. The rate was related loosely to commercial
paper rates and hardly at all to the long-term
rates. In its affinity to business conditions, the
call money rate before 1930 resembles the Treas-
ury bill rate in the 1950's.If we link these two
series in 1920 (when rates on short-term Treasury
securities start) to form a single series represent-
ing the most sensitive short-term interest rate
over the full period, a definite downtrend in the
length of lag has occurred only at peaks (see
Table 1).If instead we take commercial paper
rates as the best single indicator of short rates
over a long time span, that series also suggests
that the' lag at peaks shortened after World
War I but remained substantially the same there-
after, and that the lag at troughs remained
largely unchanged 'over all periods.
Secular trends in the rates can affect timing.
A rising trend in rates might be expected to pro-
duce longer lags at reference peaks and shorter
lags at troughs; and conversely for a falling
trend.Table 4 tests this expectation for four
periods which have fairly definite trends. Bond
yieldsfellsecularly from the mid-1870's to
around 1900, rose subsequently to World War I,
fell again during the 1920's and until after World
War II, and then rose thereafter until 1960. The
trend since then has been unclear.In Table 4
turning points near a change in direction of trend
have been omitted. The table covers bond yields
only; short-term rates have not displayed well-
defined trends.
The relative timing at peaks and troughs is
largely the reverse of the expectation. A com-
parison of periods, summarized in 'the right-hand8 BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES
TABLE 4. —MEDILEAD (—)ORLAG (-F) OF BoND YIELDS AT REFERENCE Cvci.x TURNS




pectation: short lags at peaks,
long tags at troughs)O
(Er
RISING TREND
pectation: long lags at peaks,
short lags at troughs)e
COMPARISON OF PERIODS
Number with Shorter Lag during:


































1 1 1 1




4 3 6 7
Sovaca: Appendix Table A.
Note: The fraction 3 has been dropped from the medians, as in Table 1.
eRipected direction of shift in turmng points resultiug irons trend.
columns, also suggests that trends play no part
in the timing changes.While eleven of the
twenty comparisons fit the expectation of shorter
lags at peaks during falling trends and at troughs
during rising trends, this is no more than would
occur by chance. By contrast, nineteen of the
twenty show a shorter lag in a later period.
(Railroad bonds at peaks are the exception.)
The evidence therefore supports the following
generalizations:(1)Interest-ratefluctuations
maintain a sequence, with the active open-
market rates usually turning first and the rates
of negotiated and inactive markets usually turn-
ing last.(2) All long rates used to but no longer
lag far behind short rates.(3) The turns within
the group of shorts, and within the group of long
rates, occur fairly closely together, so that the
variability of the lags within each group is much
less than the variability of the average lag for
the group between cycle turns.(4) Turning
points have clustered closer to each other and
closer to reference cycle turns over the years,
though a shortening of the lag is more evident for
longs than shorts, and for shorts more at peaks
than at troughs. In recent cycles the vanguard
of interest rates turns with, Or sometimes even
before, business activity as a whole.
So far as turning points are concerned, there-
fore, financial markets react more in unison with
each other and closer to changes in business con-
ditions than formerly. The next section brings
out a similar development in amplitude of
fluctuation.
B Amplitude
The amplitude of expansions and contractions
provides, along with timing, a revealing measure
of cyclical behavior.The cyclical amplitudes
of the interest-rate series, listed in Appendix
Table A, are summarized in Table 5 for the
same four periods covered by Table 1, except
that here the first period begins with 1885 for
the ahorts also, to omit some early cycles which
do not match referencecycles.Unmatched
cycles lessen the comparability of data between
periods. With the coverage here, the only cycli-
cal movement not matching a reference phase is
thecontractionincommercial paperrates,
1898—99.
Panel A gives per-month changes in the series
from peak-to-trough stages of reference contrac-
tions and trough-to-peak stages of expansions,
taking the negative of the algebraic change over
reference contractions. Hence the measure can
be, and sometimes is, negative, reflecting inverted
cyclical movements.Panel A amplitudes are
generally larger for later periods. As in the tim-
ing comparisons, the main exception is the call
money rate.
Much of the increase in amplitude appears to
reflect the closer conformity in timing.Lags
shift the specific cycles out of phase with refer-BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES 9
ence cycles and reduce this measure of ampli-
tude. A measure independent of timing, and
therefore a better indicator solely of the ampli-
tude of cyclical fluctuations, is the change for
specific cycle phases shown in Panel B. To be
comparable with A, Panel B excludes extra
specific cycles not matchijig reference cycles.
Also, the B averages incorporate a zero entry
when the series skips a reference phase, so as to
record the absence of any recognizable cyclical
movement.
The specific cycle amplitudes are necessarily
always positive and (barring an unusually large
number of skipped phases, not a problem here)
equal to or greater than the reference cycle
amplitudes. Aside from that difference, Panel B
does not show a clear difference in amplitude
between periods. Among the short rates except-
ing call money, there is a slight increase from the
1920's to the 1950's; but call money and com-
mercial paper had considerably larger fluctua-
tions before 1900 than in the three periods since,
which can be attributed only in part to the pre-
1914 cycles with financial panics. Among bond
yields, the evidence, though mixed for the later
periods, shows a substantial increase from before
to after World War I.
A comparison of amplitudes between periods
TABLE 5. —AVERAGEAMPLITUDE OF CYCLICAL PHASES FOR SELECTED PERIODS
(basis points per month)
1885—1900: 1900—13: 1919—29: 1953—81:
5 Expansions 4Expansions 4Expansions
andS Contractions and 3 Contractions and 3 Contractions
2 Expansions
and3 Contractions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. REFERENCE CYCLE PHASES
Short rates
Call money 15.5 13.9 15.5 5.7
Commercial paper 3.6 6.8 3.8 11.4 •
Treasury bills 6.0k 12.4
Acceptances 5.6 11.3
Bank loans 0.9 2.7
Federal Reserve discount 3.0 .7.3
Bond yields
U.S. 0.8 3.8
Corporate Aaa 0.2 3.2
Corporate Baa 0.4 2.4
Corporate and municipal —0,3 0.1 3.5
Municipal —0.1 —0.4 3.4
Railroad —0.5 0.0
New England municipal —.1.0
B. MATCHED SPECIFIC CYCLE PHASES
Short rates
Call money 31.1 27.9 19.5 7,3b
Commercial paper 22.8 11.6 10.7 11.6
Treasury bills 11.30 14.5
Acceptances 11.9° 12.4
Bank loans 4.7 5,4k
Federal Reserve discount 8.3 94b
Bond yields
U.S. 3.3 3.8
Corporate Aaa 2.5 3.9
Corporate Baa 44 37b
Corporate and municipal 1.6 2.2 4.2
Municipal 1.5 2.6 4.2
Railroad 1.4 0.9 2.2
New England municipal 1.8 1.8
Sousce: Appendix Tables A and B.
Note: Method of computntion: Algebraic change per month from trough.to.peak stages of expansions, plus negative of algebraic change per month from
peak'to'trough stages of contractions, divided by number of phases. Inverted conformity to reference cycles, therefore, gives a negative amplitude over such
cycles. The amplitude for specific cycles, of course, is always positive.If doubled, the figures give the average amplitude of a fall cycle in the period.
In Panel B the amplitude is taken as zero when no specific cycle phase matches the reference phase. The only extra specific cycle in theperiods covered
was the contraction in commercial paper rates, 1898—99; it was suppressed by computing the change per month from one matching specific turn to the next.
Skipped and extea cycles foe ruth series ace marked on Chact 'I.Exactcoverage is indicated in source.
°Fivephases only; first two phases not covered.
Four phases only; last contraction not covered.
0Sixphases only; first expansion not covered.10 BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES
can be influenced, however, by the severity of
the reference cycles that each period happens to
cover. The 1920's include the 1920—21 contrac-
tion, for example, which in severity far exceeds
any contraction during the 1950's. To allow for
differences in severity, Table 6 gives ratios of
amplitudes for specific cycle phases in which the
amplitudes of the corresponding reference cycle
phases are approximately similar as judged by
indexes of general business activity.
Well over half the ratios are above unity,
indicating that fluctuations in rates, holding the
severity of the corresponding reference phases
approximately equal, were generally greater in
the 1950's. The strongest exceptions are for call
money and low-grade corporate bonds, and for
the short rates in column 4. Also, by these pair-
ings, most rates had a comparatively greater
amplitude in the two cycles after 1957 than in
previous cycles. The largest increases are shown
'by commercial paper and Treasury bills and by
high-grade corporate and municipal bonds (again,
the more active rates). The U.S. bond yield is
an exception to the behavior of the active rates,
perhaps because it already had a comparatively
large amplitude in the 1920's (Table 5).
Tables 5 and 6 together give strong evidence
of a large though not uniform rise in amplitudes.
Bond yields had a doubling or more of amplitude
from the 1880's to the 1950's. Increases occurred
from before to after World War I as well as later.'
For short rates, on the other hand, an increase
shows up clearly only from the 1920's to the
1950's.
Secular trends in interest rates do not account
for these results.Amplitude is measured on a
per-month basis, so a steady trend adds the
same amount to each e:pansion and contraction.
With contractions treat..:'negatively, the trend
cancels out over each cycle.Since the figures
cover two expansions and three contractions in
the 1950's, however, the upward trend in that
decade on net makes our estimates of amplitude
slightly too low. Such trend effects in the other
periods are insignificant.
The similar behavior of municipal bond yields
to the other series appears to deny an explana-
tion based on the high marginal tax rate on cor-
porate and personal income in the 1950's.It
has been argued that the tax rate cuts the effec-
tiveness of any given yield to both lenders and
corporate borrowers. If corporations take advan-
tage of the tax deductibility of interest costs
and individual lenders attempt to avoid the tax
on interest income (by seeking capital gains or
nontaxable investment income), the level and
amplitude of fluctuations in market yields might
increase. There is evidence that investors now
favor tax-exempt municipal bonds and capital-
gain investments, probably for these reasons.
TABLE 6. —COMPARISONBETWEEN SPECIFIC CYCLE PHASE AMPLITUDES FOR WHICH SEVERITY OF
CORRESPONDING REFERENCE CYCLE PHASES Is SIMILAR, RATIO OS' 1950's TO 1920's
Expansions Contractions
1954—57 I958-60 1958—60 1953—54 1953—54 1957—58 1960—61
192 1—23 1924—26 1927—29 1923—24 1926—27 1923—24 1926—27
(1) '(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Short rates
Call money .5 .6 .4 .1 .3 .5 —
Commercial paper .7 3.0 1.5 6 2.8 1.6 3.1
Treasury bills .6 1.3 1.3 .9 3.0 ' 1.5 3.8
Acceptances 1.1 2.6 1.4 .2 .8 3.6 1.1
Bank loans ' 1.4 4.5 1.0 .2 .9 1.7 —
Federal Reserve discount 1.9 3.0 .8 .2 .4 1.0 —
Bond yields '
U.S. 1.6 — 1.0 1.4 1.5 .9
Corporate Aaa 2.0 — 2.8 2.6e 3.4 3.2
Corporate Baa .9 — .7 .8a 1.1 '
Corporate and municipal 2.2 — 2.5 3.2e 4.7 2.5
Municipal 2.5 1.1 1.6 2.7 4.2 3.7 5.6
SOURCE: Appendix Table A.Paired cycles of similar severity in business activity are based on Geoffrey H. Moore, Business Cycle Indicafors II, pp.
104—5 and unpablished revisions.
Note: Dates are for corresponding reference cycle phases.
Amplitude per month of the unbroken specific cycle contraction Irons 1923 to 1928 is used for both the 1923—24 and the 1926-27 contractions.BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES 11
But this cannot explain the increased amplitude
of corporate (and taxable U.S.) bond yields from
the 1920's to the 1950's, because municipal bond
yields display roughly the same increase (Table 5).
Although the evidence is based on a group of
series which are not entirely comparable from
period to period, the consensus of the measures
is that, along with timing, the amplitude of
cycles in most interest rates has responded more
and more sharply to fluctuations in business
activity of a given severity. The main qualifi-
cations involve the timing and amplitude of the
two short rates before World War I, which cannot
be appropriately compared with the series for
the later period. Effects of financial disturbances
in the 1930's and of interest-rate pegs in the
1940's and early 1950's are wholly excluded from
the comparisons. Amplitudes have been larger
in the 1950's than the 1940's, of course, because
the Federal Reserve pegged interest rates during
and after World War II.Amplitudes would
not be larger in the 1950's than the 1920's, how-
ever, unless monetary policy or other relevant
factors differed between the two periods.
III Monetary Influences on Interest Rates
From a formal point of view, changes in inter-
est rates can be interpreted as stemming from
either the demand to borrow funds or the supply
of new funds.While numerous developments
have no doubt affected the timing and amplitude
of particular interest rates, the changes dis-
cussed appear broadly based, so that .the factors
responsible seem to encompass the entire market
for funds.Moreover, since we took account of
the amplitude of business activity (Table 6), a
satisfactory explanation must account for an
increased amplitude in business cycles of given
severity. The analysis here is confined to mone-
tary influences on the supply of funds. Money
is defined as currency outside banks plus demand
and time deposits at commercial banks. The
emphasis on money is not meant to imply that
it is the most important factor affecting inter-
est rates. Others are probably more important.
But money plays a key role in monetary theory
arid policy, and the evidence to be presented.
indicates that it helps to account for the cyclical
behavior of interest rates.
New money first enters the
through the banking system and hence becomes
part of the supply of loanable funds. An in-
creased rate of monetary growth might there-
fore be expected to depress interest rates and a
reduced growth rate to increase them. This has
long been a tenet of monetary theory and be-
came a. famous thesis of the Swedish economist
Knut Wicksell, writing over half a century ago.
It implies an inverse association between the
rate of change of the money stock and interest
rates, which the evidence to be presented sub-
stantiates. Previous studies of the financial sys-
tem have largely ignored this tenet of monetary
theory and the implied effects on interest rates.6
Bank lending produces the first-round effect
on interest rates of an injection of new money.
Subsequent effects could be of equal or greater
importance. A change in monetary growth may
produce temporary discrepancies between the
public's actual and desired money holdings.In
response to such a discrepancy, the public can
be expected to alter its expenditures on goods
as well as financial assets, with repercussions on
interest rates, though the direction and duration
of these subsequent effects are complicated be-
cause they depend upon how the public adjusts
its desired money holdings as changes occur in
income, wealth, and commodity prices.(The
demand schedule mentioned in footnote 6 im-
plies an equilibrium relation between the actual
stock of money and interest rates, for given
income and wealth. The relation can help to
identify discrepancies, but does not itself indi-
cate how adjustments take place and at what
speed.) Price changes can affect market interest
rates insofar as the public takes into account
the expected rate of depreciation in the real
value of ftxed-dollar loans and securities, though
that adjustment is likely to occur slowly. An
examination of the way in which monetary
growth affects interest rates is left to a later
Numerous studies have documented an inverse associa-
tion between the stock of money and interest rates, holding
national income or wealth constant. This allegedly reflects a
dependence of the demand to hold money on interest rates, in
which an increase in the stock induces a fall in rates to equate
the demand and the supply. Such a relation is different from
(though not inconsistent with) that discussed in the text,
which postulates an effect of the rate of change of the mOney
stock on the supply of loanable funds and thence on interest
rates, which equilibrates the supply and demand for loanable
funds. Both effects could, of course occur at the same time.
Some evidence on the stock demand to hold money is presented
economy mainlybelow.